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“Film Censorship as a Good Business in Colonial Korea: Profiteering From
Hollywood's First Golden Age, 1926–1936”
Brian Yecies, University of Wollongong, Australia

Abstract
Between 1926 and 1936, cinema in colonial Korea was a vibrant business, involving the
production of domestic films and the distribution and exhibition of American, British,
Chinese, French, German, Italian, and Russian films. During this decade, the first golden age
of American cinema in Korea, Hollywood films overwhelmingly dominated the Korean
market. Korea was an important territory that Hollywood used in its overall global expansion
campaign. Amid this globalization operation, the Government-General of Chōsen’s film
censorship apparatus was a financially self-sustaining operation. It paid for its operation by
profiteering from the application of more than 6,700 American and 630 other countries’
feature and non-feature films, a vast majority of which were approved with minor, if any,
censorship changes. The Government-General’s systematization of film censorship policies
was intended to obstruct Communist, revolutionary, and later, socialist themes rather than
“Western” themes—at least until the late 1930s, when the Japanese Department of Home
Affairs began banning the import of American films and the Government-General intensified
the suppression of Korean culture.

On April 2, 2005, a conference panel at the fifty-seventh annual meeting of the
Association for Asian Studies (AAS) focused on the Japanese Censorship System and Korean
Responses in Colonial Korea. Collectively, the panel attempted to proffer a deeper
understanding of the colonial period by showcasing the multifaceted ways Koreans
negotiated hegemony with imperial Japan, and more specifically censorship policies, which
were at the center of the colonial venture.1
The particular focus and timing of this formative AAS panel provide an explicit
wake-up call about the scholarly and historical significance of censorship studies and its
status as an emerging area of research. Scholars must pursue a plethora of new directions and
paradigms in order to gain a more rigorous understanding of Japan’s larger imperial cultural
agenda. Given the challenge of scarce primary sources, among other research limitations, this
is no easy task. Primary sources do exist. In this article, I refer to my recent discovery of a
small but diverse collection of Japanese, Korean, and English language archive documents
concerning film policy and censorship in colonial Korea. To my knowledge, these documents
have never been discussed in English or Korean.2
This article attempts to contribute to the larger ongoing discussions and analyses of
the Korean cinema, and to move beyond the conventional and nationalist claims reiterated in
many Korean and English-language sources. There is a rich and complex story here, which
revolves around the activities of the Government-General of Chōsen (Chōsen Sōtokufu in
Japanese), Hollywood distributors, and Korean filmmakers, and their impact on the film
industry in colonial Korea. Each profited from film censorship in different ways. Specifically,
I focus on the colonial film censorship apparatus in Korea and the dominant role that
Hollywood motion pictures played in the Korean market during the 1920s and 1930s.3
In 1933, a new censorship building was constructed in the Government-General
complex in Seoul with state-of-the-art silent and sound film projection equipment compatible
with all film formats (sizes, sprocket dimensions, etc.) from around the world.4 According to
detailed Japanese censorship statistics and other archive documents discussed in this article,
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the new facility cost ¥50,475.5 It was built to meet the demands of an astounding increase in
the number of films being censored in colonial Korea. More than a quarter-million yen in
total fees, generated from thousands of censorship applications of feature and nonfeature
films between 1926 and 1936, helped to pay for the Government-General of Chōsen’s new
censorship building.6 During this time, the total number of films censored was slightly more
than 24,000 items (107,736 rolls equalling more than 25,300,000 meters), and total revenues
soared to ¥262,080.7 Censorship application fees collected by the Government-General of
Chōsen between April 1, 1935 and March 31, 1936 alone amounted to ¥29,568—about 11
percent of the total fees collected over this decade. The Government-General’s decision to
build a new facility came at an opportune time.8
Within this environment, Japanese, Korean, and American distributors contributed
immensely to the livelihood of the censorship apparatus—both as a process and an authority.
Japanese, Korean, and American distribution agents based in both Tokyo and Seoul applied
for and received censorship approval to exhibit 7,376 feature films—6,737 from Hollywood
and 639 from other countries—between 1926 and 1936. These figures rise to a combined
total of 9,404 foreign films after including nonfeature films (documentary, commercial, and
propaganda). More than 90 percent of the films submitted were Hollywood films. As other
studies briefly note, the Censorship Board often used the tactic of granting censorship
approval to a film and then turning around and prohibiting it from being screened. A number
of different reasons, such as fire hazard or threat to local order, were used to block some
films from reaching their intended audiences.9 Although it is unclear exactly how many films
were actually screened, it is clear that Hollywood contributed substantially to film culture in
Korea. In fact, the American film industry helped to subsidize the advancement of the
Government-General of Chōsen’s censorship apparatus.
To this end, I see Hollywood as an unintended “pro-imperial Japanese collaborator”
(ilche hyŏmnyŏkcha in Korean)—not in the finger-pointing and witch-hunting ways outlined
in other studies,10 but implicitly, by legitimizing Japanese colonial authority and financially
supporting the occupation of Korea. I begin by examining the Government-General of
Chōsen’s film censorship policy, and the ways in which its development helped the Motion
Picture Producers and Distributors Association of America (MPPDAA) reach its goal of
simultaneously profiting from the Korean market and expanding Hollywood’s worldwide
domination.11

Systematizing Film Censorship
In 1916, Hasegawa Yoshimichi became Governor-General of Chōsen (Sōtoku in
Japanese). A notorious achievement of his administration was the promulgation of a set of
film regulations, which attempted to restrict not only the exhibition of foreign films in Korea
but also the production of local films.12 It may be that the Government-General anticipated
the coming and development of film activity in the Korean market. The origins of film policy
in Korea and its later restrictions on the expression of culture can be traced back to
regulations enacted by Hasegawa on August 1, 1918.13 Motion Picture Regulations formed in
Japan proper in 1917 provided the basis for this treatment.14 Policy amendments occurred in
1920, 1922, 1926, 1928, 1933, 1934, 1935, and 1940. Major revisions usually occurred
shortly after a new governor-general was appointed. Cinema’s popularity in Korea and its
power as an influential mass medium rose in tandem with the colonial authority’s desire to
regulate many aspects of both the film industry and Korean culture.15
Micromanaging the film industry in Korea was a governmental priority because film
was thought to possess an influential power over society and culture. Indeed, Japanese
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authorities had capitalized on the media as a propaganda tool as far back as 1868, when the
early Meiji press policy was formed. Since this early date, the Japanese government, as well
as private industry in Japan, had understood that the mass media were a powerful tool, which
could communicate ideological messages to the masses.16 It was no accident, then, that the
Government-General applied these early regulatory precautions to the exhibition,
distribution, and later, production of films in the Korean market.17
After 1918, every exhibitor, local producer, and foreign distribution agent had to
apply to the nearest provincial police station for a permit to screen every film. Guidelines
established two film-rating categories—the first for films suitable for audiences younger than
fifteen years of age, and a second for adults (older than fifteen). Men and women were
prohibited from sitting together unless they were married. Any film, domestic (Korean and
Japanese) or foreign, which sensationalized adultery, arson, crime, murder, or attacks on
authorities, was prohibited.18 The Police Bureau (Keimukyoku in Japanese), and not the actual
censorship regulations, determined what part of a film’s content was “inappropriate” and
“injurious to the public order, customs or health”.19 The showing of murder, torture, brutality,
antireligious themes, theft, nudity, jailbreak, and revolutionary or politically independent
ideas that might undermine governmental authority was considered conducive to “dangerous
thoughts”.20 The provincial police stations, which oversaw film censorship at the local level,
censored (cut) all films that overtly contained these types of scenes and/or revolutionary ideas
and images.
Provincial police chiefs also determined scenario/script revisions and established
location exceptions/restrictions. They had the power to close cinemas and/or disrupt
screenings of films for violating censorship regulations and to punish the perpetrators.
Exhibited films experienced varying forms of regulatory attention in an ad hoc system that
varied from district to district. A lack of uniformity between different police chiefs, who may
or may not have been susceptible to bribery, continued to be a problem throughout the late
1910s and early 1920s. Censorship was a crude process because each province inspected
films and administered punishments for violations in different ways.21 Unlike the legal
precedents, which were set in the courts, the regulatory efforts and procedures followed by
individual (provincial) police chiefs and stations had little objectivity or few unified standards
across multiple regions. Hence, local police stations regulated the exhibition and distribution
of films with their heavy fists rather than the censor’s careful snip.
Once through the censorship process, domestic and foreign films, including multiple
copies of the same film, received a formal stamp of approval. Written exhibition permits
specified the period of time and number of screenings allowed. A film that failed to receive a
screening permit could be re-edited and resubmitted, with additional censorship application
fees, to the same provincial police station. The collection of these multiple censorship fees
soon gave rise to a stronger censorship apparatus by providing opportunities to reap a steady
income. In this way, the film censorship process and apparatus in Korea was financially selfsustaining.22
The new film censorship regime was enacted in response to the global activities of the
MPPDAA, which was helping the major and minor Hollywood studios expand their
distribution networks and territories throughout the world and, more specifically, in Asia.
Around this time, markets in Asia, and Japan in particular, were no longer considered “junk
markets” because of the potential to earn lucrative profits from film rental contracts.23
Hollywood distributors simply desired to expand and maximize their profits throughout the
“Orient,” an increasingly important market for the United States after World War I due to
distribution opportunities lost in European markets.24
In August 1919, Admiral Saitō Makoto replaced Hasegawa as the governor-general of
Chōsen. Government offices and ministries throughout Korea began to encourage Koreans to
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support Japan’s colonial and thus nationalistic agenda, which in 1937 eventually became
known as the assimilationist slogan: “Japan and Korea as one country” (Naisen ittai).25
Surprisingly, however, Governor Saitō launched a new cultural policy designed to relax
Japanese administrative control over Korean cultural and artistic activities across the
peninsula. This was Saitō’s first “gift” to Korea. It seems that Saitō was interested in altering
the image of the Japanese Empire after the March First independence movement in 1919 and
rendering the administrative operation in Korea more efficient.26 Writers, actors, filmmakers,
and theater entrepreneurs took advantage of this new opportunity and began developing or
negotiating spaces for the expression of Korean culture. This was a hopeful time for Korean
intellectuals and artists, as cinema became a “node of cultural construction.”27 Allowing
Koreans to gain film production training and experience—or at least not entirely preventing
them from doing so—encouraged the creation of a Korean cinema. Hence, it was not an
accident that one of the earliest Korean films—The Righteous Revenge or Loyal Revenge
(Ŭirichŏk kutu), a multimedia kino-drama—was made in 1919.28
On August 1, 1926, Governor-General Saitō’s administration launched a new film
policy—Government-General Law No. 59—which became Korea’s first systematized,
national film censorship regulations. Law No. 59 mirrored the regulations ratified in 1925 in
Japan proper. The whole empire now had a cohesive approach to film censorship, giving the
minister of Home Affairs a larger degree of power. The Japanese government, through the
Government-General’s administration, was able to control the exhibition of domestic and
foreign films with stricter central censorship regulations while delegating regulatory power to
provincial police authorities who could concentrate on whether or not a film was detrimental
to public peace and cultural customs on a localized level. Socially acceptable films avoided
violating the dignity of the emperor and were “free from impediment to the maintenance of
public peace, custom, or hygiene”.29 Law No. 59 thus reinforced a kind of
international/national/local hierarchy, which in reality was not always easy to control
completely.
Along with Law No. 59, Saitō created a national Censorship Board (Kenetsu iinkai).
The board began methodically to record explicit data concerning the total number of
applications, reels, reel lengths, script and reel rejections, types of restrictions, and total fees
of all domestic and international feature and nonfeature films censored. According to the
Film Daily Year Book—one of the key sources in the United States for international film
trade data and news—the MPPDAA immediately became concerned about the stricter
censorship’s implications for the distribution of Hollywood films in the Japanese imperial
market, especially in Korea.30 The MPPDAA’s fears, however, were unfounded, as the
censorship apparatus rejected very few American films. Hollywood films were warmly
accepted, along with their associated censorship application fees.
Saitō’s second “gift” to Korea and especially to the nascent Korean film industry, was
his decision to enable or at least not prevent Koreans from submitting more than 450
domestic Korean and Japanese and more than 2,100 foreign films for censorship approval. In
this way, Saitō liberated the film industry as he did other manufacturing and production
industries, and encouraged an expanding consumer class with resources that supported local
filmmakers and entertainment entrepreneurs.31 Hence, film culture in Korea throughout the
Japanese colonial period flourished. As discussed below, individuals and groups of Korean
film people, perhaps similarly to the Korean business elite, played a noteworthy role in
Korean cinema’s growth and development in previously unrecognized ways.32
Numerous film genres, along with an active field of critical and fan-based film
magazines and newspaper articles about local and international cinema, contributed to a filmliterate society.33 Feature and short films as well as kino-dramas were intended as
entertainment. Education films (kyōiku eiga), business/public relations advertisements
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(senden or kōkoku eiga) from institutions such as the Meiji Confectionary Company (Meiji
Seika) and Tokyo Electric Light Company (Tokyo Dentō), and documentary films
(dokyumentarii eiga) were used for nonentertainment purposes.34 Other film genres, which
involved a mix of both educational and entertainment purposes, included: battle records
(senki eiga), cartoons, current-events (jiji eiga), industrial, newsreels (nyūsu eiga), public
(kōekiteki senden eiga), record (kiroku eiga), sanitary, science (kagaku eiga), small-gauge
(kogata eiga), sport, tourist, and war conditions films (senkyō eiga).35 The three most
prevalent types of films were cultural films (bunka eiga), public films, and short- and featurelength propaganda films (puropaganda or senden geki eiga). Cultural films aimed to alert
Japanese and foreign audiences to the uniqueness of Japanese culture.36 Public films were
imperialistic films containing actual war footage. Propaganda films often presented action,
adventure, and espionage narratives containing imperial and overt nationalistic Naisen ittai
(Naesŏn ilch’e in Korean) themes.37 Naisen ittai sentiments in both the public and
propaganda films were used in Korea to serve the colonial agenda and act as inspirational
recruitment tools for the war effort.
After 1926, nonfeature films designed to educate Korean and Japanese audiences
were exempt from paying censorship application fees. The fees generated from an abundance
of Hollywood feature films thus helped to subsidize the screenings of nonfeature and
commercial films. Around the same time, the Government-General began requesting that a
higher number of propaganda films be screened in Korea. Japanese distributors eagerly
supplied so-called public films, which were used to educate the public. Public films were
regarded highly by the Censorship Board and were exempt from application fees. This
provided a drive for Japanese film companies to increase the production of cultural and
educational propaganda films, which in turn promoted assimilationist ideology to Koreans
and supported the Japanese film industry.
Censorship application fees were based solely on film length. In Japan, for example, a
short, 1,000 meter film cost the applicant (the film owner or rental agent) ¥16.66, or
approximately $8 US dollars. A feature-length film of 2,400 meters cost ¥39.98 or $19 US
dollars.38 The fees for censoring additional copies of the same film amounted to 40 percent of
the cost of the first copy. Major studios such as Universal, Fox, and Paramount often sent
multiple copies of the same film to a single market in order to arrange simultaneous
screenings in different capital cities. Applying for re-censorship also incurred fees of 40
percent of whatever applicants paid the first time around for the first copy of the film.
Newsreels and other current event films—often inspected by provincial authorities rather
than a centralized censorship board—were charged one sen per length of three meters. Given
the considerable monetary requirement involved in applying for censorship approval in Japan
proper, only the more financially stable organizations, especially the ones that survived the
Great Depression, could afford to distribute and exhibit a large number of films in Japan.
This probably explains why, between the mid- to late-1920s, films made by the major
Hollywood studios occupied from 22 to 30 percent share of the Japanese market while
European films only attained about 3 percent.39 There was no apparent reason for the
Censorship Board to treat Hollywood films harshly.
By comparison, the Government-General of Chōsen’s censorship apparatus charged
50 to 60 percent less than applicants paid in Japan. Censorship application fees in Korea were
one sen per meter of footage for the first (original) print and one-half of one sen per meter of
footage for duplicate copies.40 These considerably lower fees were a huge economic incentive
for distributors of Hollywood films to flood the Korean market with their products well into
the 1930s. In fact, the share of Hollywood films in the Korean market remained higher than
in Japan proper, reaching heights of 40 percent of the total length of film actually screened in
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Korea. The percentages of total audiences at American films, as well as the number of film
rentals, also exceeded those in Japan.41
In August 1934, according to the American consulate-general in Seoul, U.S. films
dominated the motion picture screens in Korea, with as much as 62 percent of the market.
More than half of Seoul’s major cinemas were screening foreign—primarily American—
films, which outnumbered all other countries’ films five-fold. Although box office figures are
not readily available in this groundwork study, the number of German, British, French, and
Russian films followed Hollywood films, in that order.42 During this time, Fox, Paramount,
Warner Bros.–First National, Universal, independent agent J. H. Morris and others who
represented Columbia, MGM, RKO, and United Artists—all controlling members of the
MPPDAA—had direct distribution offices in Seoul. Korea was unquestionably a key territory
for Hollywood distributors.43 There was no better market in Asia for Hollywood films than
colonial Korea.44
Hollywood’s First Golden Age in Korea
The growth of the censorship apparatus in Korea began with the increasing Japanese
police presence in the colony, which grew stronger during Admiral Saitō’s regime.45 As
described, police troops played a central role in the enforcement of film policies. Aspiring
Korean filmmakers, as well as the MPPDAA, began to witness the tightening of film
regulations by provincial police bureaus. At the same time, Japanese film studios were eager
to utilize the Korean exhibition market, which included hundreds of thousands of Japanese
citizens who had begun migrating to Korea after the annexation in 1910.46
Out of an approximate total of 31,100 reels of feature films censored between 1926
and 1936, a paltry 52 reels were rejected. In addition, a mere 537 scenarios (or 8 percent) of
all 6,737 U.S. feature films censored during these two decades were restricted from being
screened. Film parts cut for reasons of public peace and order (kōan) were 4,668 meters or
six-hundredths of one percent of the 7,646,741 total meters of film censored. Similarly, an
insignificant 6,604 meters of film parts were cut for reasons of manners and customs/public
morals (fūzoku). Out of all 626 feature films submitted in 1936 alone to the Censorship
Board, not a single film was rejected outright.47 As busy as it was, the Censorship Board
seemed to accept and approve of the contents of nearly all U.S. films. That is, U.S. films were
not seen as jeopardizing public peace, displaying immoral manners, or marring imperial
Japan’s “good and beautiful customs” (ryōfū bizoku).48
The relative ease of being passed by the Censorship Board made the distribution of
films in Korea extremely convenient for the Hollywood distribution agents/exchanges. It may
be that Hollywood distributors exploited the censor’s motives in order to submit every
possible print for exhibition. In turn, the Government-General saw an opportunity to profit
from thousands of would-be censorship applications and their associated fees.49 Censorship
applications were warmly accepted regardless of the quality of the print(s) in question. In this
symbiotic nod-nod-wink-wink relationship, neither Hollywood nor the Censorship Board had
much to lose. Moreover, the overabundance of American films in the Korean market during
the 1920s and 1930s goaded Korean filmmakers. Although these connections are difficult to
prove, the boom in Korea’s silent film production—its first golden age—corresponded with
the deluge of Hollywood films in Korea. This was undoubtedly the first golden age for the
American cinema in Korea and the larger Asian territory.50 However, the openness with
which American films were received was afforded only to certain types of Korean films.
According to comments made by the Bureau of Police Affairs in 1935 during the
Sixty-ninth Imperial Parliament, censorship in Korea had to be “strict” (gensei) and “careful”
(neniri), because Korean customs and thought patterns were different from those in Japan
(Chōsen no fūzoku shūkan wa naichi to kotonaru).51 In effect, the assimilationist approach
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was easier said than done. Censorship laws restricted freedoms of expression throughout the
empire and suppressed films that criticized society and/or glorified revolution.52 One of the
primary aims of the Censorship Board was to suppress Korean independence and Communist
themes, which criticized society and/or glorified revolution. One would have expected the
censorship regime to target socialist themes too. Nevertheless, between the late 1920s and
mid-1930s, members of the Korean Artist Proletarian Federation (KAPF) in Korea and
Nippon Artist Proletarian Federation (NAPF) in Japan made a small number of socially
conscious films.53 For almost seven years, the Japanese Home Ministry and GovernmentGeneral of Chōsen overlooked these interrelated groups of filmmakers—until films with
socialist themes were stifled by the so-called cultural crackdown at the end of GovernorGeneral Ugaki Kazushige and the beginning of Governor-General Minami Jirō’s regime in
1936.54
Without question, historical/period (jidai eiga), modern/contemporary (gendai eiga),
and documentary films made in Korea by all-Korean and/or part-Korean and part-Japanese
production crews experienced censorship problems.55 Titles that sounded overtly
revolutionary were changed. Scenes too critical of the Japanese Empire were cut and/or reshot. One of the first cases of the censorship of Korean films occurred in April 1925, when
the Censorship Board changed the name of the film Dark Light (Amkwang) to Make-up of
God (Sinŭi Chang), and forced Japanese director Takasa Kancho (whose Korean name was
Wang Pil-yŏl) to reduce its length. The next film censored was director Yi Kyŏng-son’s King
of the Mountain Bandits (Sanch’aewang), produced in September 1926 by the Kerim Film
Association (Kerim yŏnghwa hyŏphoe)—an all-Korean film company. Authorities forced the
Kerim Film Association to cut Sanch’aewang from a seven- to a five-reel film. In November
1926, a third censorship case involved the cutting and re-shooting of about 1,000 feet of
director Na Un-kyu’s The Boy with Great Ambition (Pungun-a).56
Around the time of General Ugaki Kazushige’s appointment as governor-general and
the escalation of the Manchurian Incident in 1931, filmmakers in Korea began to experience
the tightening of film regulations. This corresponded to Japan’s overall tightening of cultural
policies and the general oppression of Korean culture during that time. In particular, stricter
film policies began to shut Korean audiences off from foreign films as a higher exhibition
quota of Japanese films began to take hold. All aspects of the film industry were now
subservient to Japan’s Wartime Regime System (Rinsen taisei), which prioritized the war
effort over all other social, cultural, economic, industrial, and political concerns in ways
similar to those applied to the German film industry in the lead-up to World War II.
On April 26, 1933, the governor-general declared Law No. 40. It required that all
foreign films shown in Korea first be imported into Japan and then later distributed to the
colony.57 Hollywood’s formerly successful direct distribution strategies were no longer
possible. The governor-general was attempting to create a stricter approach to the distribution
and exhibition of foreign—primarily American—films in Korea as part of a larger
“Surveillance State.”58 Bureaucratic mechanisms now threatened Hollywood’s golden age,
and the U.S. film industry’s cultural autonomy in the Korean market.59
By the end of 1934, each imported film was subjected to a system of double
censorship. First, prints were examined by customs officials at the Japanese port of entry, and
then examined under closer and more bureaucratic scrutiny at the Japanese Censorship
Bureau in Tokyo. Locating and deleting “objectionable” (akueikyō) scenes—such as those
with riots or anti-authority, revolutionary, and communist propaganda—continued to be the
focus of censorship cuts. The Censorship Board allowed images of naked bodies, but kissing
was prohibited. Any images or stories offensive to the Japanese Empire or the monarchy
were strictly prohibited.60 The Russian films Battleship Potemkin and Mother were two such
films, banned from exhibition in Korea and Japan because of their social and ideological
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messages.61 Still, only 10 out of about 2,400 imported films were banned in Japan in 1933,
including 8 American, 1 Russian, and 1 German. Between January and September of 1934,
only 1 out of 1,954 American films submitted for censorship was banned.62
A few titles of Warner Bros.–First National Pictures, which received censorship
approval in 1934 and were in fact screened, included: Footlight Parade, Gold Diggers of
1933, Captured, I Am a Fugitive from a Chain Gang, 42nd Street, Crowd Roars, Winner Take
All, Fashions, Son of a Sailor, Tiger Shark, Central Air Port, Frisco Jenny, Little Giant, and
Last Flight.63 These were visually entertaining sound films that Korean and Japanese
audiences could easily appreciate because their narratives relied little on knowledge of the
English language. Hollywood films were not dubbed into the local language, although it
would not have been illegal to do so. It was standard practice to add Korean and/or Japanese
subtitles and other explanatory notes to most prints.64 Censorship applications for all Englishlanguage films required two copies of explanatory notes or the whole dialogue script
translated into either Japanese or Korean. All intertitles and subtitles had to be provided in
English, as well as one of the local languages.65
Ironically, this stricter film policy stimulated Korean film production, as Korean films
were now categorized as “domestic” (kokusan) films. Through the Governor-General Order
No. 82, ratified on August 7, 1934, General Ugaki mandated that 25 percent of all pictures
shown in Korea had to be of domestic origin—that is, of Japanese and/or Korean origin. The
regulations had a positive impact on the Korean film industry because they gave “hope” to
filmmakers.
Another positive outcome for Korean filmmakers in the late 1930s, according to the
International Cinema Association of Japan, was an expanding exhibition market in Japan
proper and Manchuria, which was seen as “one of the most hopeful signs for the future of the
Korean cinema.”66 Although the industry remained unstable primarily because ample and
continuous funding was lacking, nearly 115 films (including twelve talkies) were produced in
Korea between 1926 and 1937, making this period Korea’s first golden age of cinema.67 An
average of one film was made every five weeks, and a new film company was formed each
time a new production began.68 Korean and Japanese producers and filmmakers utilized this
one-off funding strategy until 1942, when the Government-General took complete control
over film production in the Korean colony and consolidated all film companies into the single
company called Chosŏn Film Production Co. (Chosŏn yŏnghwa chechak chusikhoesa)—
much as Adolf Hitler did in Germany when he assigned Joseph Goebbels to take over the
UFA studios in 1933.
Throughout the late 1920s and 1930s, Korea’s film culture grew through its ties with
Japan. Korean filmmakers gained production experience by traveling back and forth to
Japan.69 For example, Yi Pil-wu—the cinematographer of Korea’s first successful and most
famous talkie, Chunhyang-chŏn (Story of Chunhyang, 1935), spent time in Osaka studying at
the film libraries of the Osaka Mainichi newspaper, which opened its doors to commercial
and artistic filmmakers in July 1927.70 By early 1931, Korean filmmakers no longer needed
to travel to Japan to gain experience because local branches of the Osaka Mainichi film
library and training center were opened in Seoul and Daegu. Both libraries were outfitted
with “well-equipped” projectors and a supply of films from the Mainichi library. Weekly
screenings of educational and cultural films were arranged at the two Korean branches and
basic production classes were offered as well.71 The main objective was to: “raise the quality
of education by films through research and experiments in actual educational and social
problems.”72 In essence, the Osaka Mainichi library and training program was an innovative
attempt to coalesce the social and political attitudes and beliefs of all of Japan’s imperial
subjects. Armed with technical know-how, social/business contacts with Japanese
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filmmakers, and an intense desire to express themselves through film, Korean filmmakers
continued to sharpen their production skills and made more films.
While Korean filmmakers were gaining production experience, producers focused on
profiting from the exhibition side of the industry. Between August 1, 1926 and March 31,
1936, Korean entertainment entrepreneurs such as Pak Sŭng-pil, Yi Ku-yŏng, and Cho
Chung-hwan, as well as producers and directors such as Yi Pil-wu, Kim Dong-pyŏng, and Yi
Ch’ang-gŭn, applied for approval to exhibit 267 Korean and Japanese films (most likely from
the smaller Japanese film companies) for entertainment purposes but only one
nonentertainment contemporary film. Approximately 18.5 percent (50) of these were
historical entertainment films, while 81.5 percent (217) belonged to the contemporary genre.
The Censorship Board passed all of the reels of historical-entertainment films without any
rejections. However, a number of scenes from both the historical and contemporary genre
were restricted for violating the rules against public peace and public morals. During this
decade, Korean distribution agents also brought 201 nonfeature Japanese films, such as
documentaries, public films, and commercial advertisements, and around nine nonfeature
foreign films before the Censorship Board. Unfortunately, these statistics do not reveal the
specific names of these films.
This same group of Korean entertainment entrepreneurs, producers, and directors
brought an even more impressive 1,850 Hollywood films and 276 entertainment films from
other countries before the Censorship Board. If all of the approved films had reached cinema
screens, Koreans would have brought an average of 106 foreign films to Korea per year—
about two per week. Consequently, with the total number of American films directly
distributed by Hollywood studios, people living in Korea during the colonial period would
have watched a lot of American films. There may not have been continuous financial support
for local film production, but there were literally thousands of opportunities to facilitate the
exhibition of American and other foreign films.
However, as Hollywood film distributors were forced to import their films to Korea
via Japan, Korean film companies suffered from a lack of distribution profits and regularized
funding, especially for the experimentation and conversion to sound-on-disc and sound-onfilm technology. As a result, Japanese film companies with access to ample funds increased
their distribution opportunities throughout the Korean market. At the same time, the
governor-general’s policies helped regulate or reduce the penetration of so-called “bad
culture” in foreign films into the minds of Korean audiences while the Japanese were
preparing for war.73 The Japanese authority was attempting to use a screen quota to control
foreign films, which contained potentially influential propaganda.74 Despite this, it was much
harder to enforce the double censorship policy because of limited human resources. During
1934, a total of 17,468 film reels were submitted to the Censorship Bureau in Japan; only
651, or less than 4 percent, were rejected. About 48 percent of those rejected were from the
United States.75 The Department of Home Affairs in Tokyo, as well as its branch in Seoul,
simply lacked sufficient censorship staff. For example, in mid-1925, Tokyo’s Censorship
Board employed forty-four members. According to statistics for the period between 1926 and
1936, the number of all domestic and foreign films submitted for censorship totaled
approximately 20,320, amounting to 93,407 reels.76 Censors throughout Japan and Korea
would have had their hands full and eyes blurred.
At the end of 1935, General Ugaki attempted to protect Japan’s domestic film
industry further by strengthening the laws regarding the market share of domestic films in the
Korean and Japanese markets. The screen quota system was raised from 25 percent to onethird, increasing exhibition market barriers for American and European distributors and their
silent and sound films. One-third of the films screened at any given cinema had to be
domestic—Japanese or Korean.
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There was even greater loss of distribution opportunities for foreign film exchanges in
Korea in early 1937, after General Minami Jirō, the new governor-general, declared that at
least half of the films screened in Korea had to originate domestically. This had significant
implications for distributors of American films. The American distributors complained about
the stringent laws at numerous industry conferences.77
Finally, on behalf of Hollywood distributors and because of the quota limits placed on
the number of imported U.S. films and the more stringent censorship regulations, the
MPPDAA was forced to negotiate its members’ livelihood with the Japanese Department of
Home Affairs and the Government-General of Chōsen. During this time, according to
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) archive documents, hundreds of
thousands of dollars in film rental profits were at stake because U.S. films had been screened
extensively and well attended throughout Japan and Korea. When the Sino-Japanese war
broke out in 1937, the Japanese Empire was run by the total war system. The Japanese
government prioritized the protection of its domestic film industry and the education of its
imperial subjects. In effect, the Government-General no longer needed to profiteer from
Hollywood censorship applications because it had already made a fortune. In 1938, when the
film import quota was set at 100 features per year, Hollywood distributors were unable to
recover the market strength gained from the first golden age of American cinema in Asia. The
Japanese authority seemed paranoid about the potential for Hollywood films and American
culture influencing citizens of the Japanese Empire.78 Then, when the United States entered
World War II, links between the American film industry and the Japanese and Korean
markets were broken completely; all U.S. films and related materials from local Hollywood
distribution offices (exchanges) were impounded.79
Concluding Thoughts
Throughout the colonial period, the production of domestic (Japanese and Korean)
films as well as the distribution and exhibition of international (American, British, Chinese,
French, German, Italian, and Russian) films was plentiful. The development and enforcement
of colonial film policy, including censorship, were designed to manage this active sphere of
film culture in Korea.
The Government-General launched strict regulations in the mid-1930s after
Governor-General Ugaki Kazushige initiated a higher exhibition quota of domestic films,
while blocking American films.80 Film culture in general was seen as part of a very young
industry and a new form of cultural expression. Its power to influence the masses and make
an impact on society was demonstrated by the Japanese authority’s fervor to regulate using
means similar to those by which they regulated the telecommunications, transportation,
mining, and agricultural industries.
The sheer volume of censorship statistics from the period between August 1, 1926 and
March 31, 1936 is astounding. As expected, the censorship fees generated from processing
this magnitude of films were likewise impressive. The entire film censorship operation
exploited the large number of American and Japanese films imported into the colony. In other
words, the American film industry significantly helped to subsidize the advancement of the
Government-General of Chōsen’s censorship apparatus. Regrettably, very little funding from
this windfall was reinvested in the Korean film industry. Rather, a sizable amount of this
funding was redirected in 1933 to build a new censorship facility. This state-of-the-art
administrative and screening facility, including new 16mm and 35mm dual sound-on-disc
and sound-on-film projectors, signalled the expansion of a more lucrative censorship
business.
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The screening of more than 6,700 Hollywood films in Korea during the colonial
period was not a fait accompli. A deeper exploration of the censorship status of all of these
films is needed elsewhere. It would be revealing to learn more about the specific scenes that
were cut or limited (seigen) from this larger group of American films that passed
(ken’etsuzumi). In addition, this total number of films would have included multiple copies of
the same film, per censorship application requirements. More scrutiny is needed to better
gauge the actual number of films screened in the Korean market. Further consideration of the
annual budget belonging to the Government-General’s film censorship apparatus within the
larger context of the entire colonial administration’s budget is also needed. Nevertheless, the
censorship apparatus benefited from collecting a mass of application fees while circuitously
preventing some films from being screened. Without knowing more about the personal
backgrounds and career paths of the members of the Film Censorship Board, it might be
unfair to assert that they were unqualified to monitor and manage this highly significant
cultural industry. However, it is possible to assume that the censors’ subjective decisions
would have swayed censorship criteria. Their decisions might have been rather crude—
simply based on manifest content.
My research corroborates the view that Japanese censorship policies in colonial Korea
were overwhelmingly directed at socialist, Communist, and revolutionary expressions and
themes, rather than “Western” ones. Perhaps this partly explains why the rate of censorship
rejection for American films was so low—a claim that complicates how the invention and
development of cinema affected Korean culture. Here, one might well ask whether the act of
watching thousands of Hollywood films during the Japanese colonial period constituted, for
the Koreans, a form of passive resistance. Unfortunately, it is difficult to substantiate this
specific argument with empirical evidence since there are few available source materials.
Indeed, a large void exists in the evidence published to date, which documents and analyzes
the political economy, audience reception, and cultural transformation of the film industry in
Korea during the colonial period. Archive materials, business records, and government files
are few and far between, not to mention that few films made in Korea before 1945 exist
today. More exploratory research is needed in this fascinating area.
The Government-General permitted Korean filmmakers to create spaces, within
moderate parameters, to express a national culture and spirit through Korean cinema. This
continued to be the case until the mid- and late-1930s, when Governors-General Ugaki
Kazushige and Minami Jirō began tightening the oppression of many facets of Korean
culture. However, censorship was complicated in Korea because of the potential impact a
film’s contents had on Korean audiences. By their own admission, the police treated the
production, distribution, and exhibition of films seriously, given the perceived influence that
the development of talkie (sound) technology had on Korean society. The Censorship Board
may have believed that listening to the Korean native tongue on film was the same as
participating in a cultural nationalistic activity. At the same time, the police recognized that
Korean films could subvert the colonial agenda, and they viewed them with great seriousness
as a result.
Between 1926 and 1936, Korean filmmakers gained the practical production
experience and technical know-how needed to make their own films. Japanese studios
successfully expanded their domestic film market, and more importantly, served the imperial
agenda. Hollywood distributors screened their films—many, many of them—and Hollywood
experienced its first golden age in Korea. Finally, the Government-General and its censorship
apparatus benefited from many thousands of censorship application fees. Each of these
groups and aggregates of individuals struggled to maintain control, to have a cultural impact,
and to attract audiences. Each player, albeit at different and overlapping times, was at least
partly successful in gaining valuable ground.
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